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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2559 
___________ 
 
TRI THANH NGUYEN, Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT;  
DEPUTY STROBLE; DEPUTY CARTER;  
DEPUTY HALL; SHERIFF DUANE ANTHONY;  
OTHER UNKNOWN COUNTY OFFICERS; FRANKLIN COUNTY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-01866) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2013 
Before:  SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed January 29, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Appellant, Tri Thanh Nguyen, appeals pro se from the judgment entered against 
him by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm.  
I. 
 Nguyen is a Pennsylvania inmate who was incarcerated at the Franklin County Jail 
(“FCL”).  In September 2010, he commenced a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
in the District Court against the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department and four of its 
employees—Sheriff Anthony, and Deputies Stroble, Carter, and Hall.  In the complaint, 
Nguyen alleged that, in October 2008, while detained at the FCJ pending trial on sexual 
assault charges, he was escorted by Franklin County deputies to the Franklin County 
Courthouse, placed in a group holding cell, and left unattended.  While in the group cell, 
one of the other inmates slipped out of his handcuffs and assaulted Nguyen.  Nguyen 
claimed that he was assaulted due to the “lax transportation practices of the Franklin 
County Sheriffs, which was known to and ratified by the defendants.”  (Compl., Dist. Ct. 
Dkt. # 1, at ¶ 34.)  Specifically, Nguyen alleged that the defendants had customs and 
policies in place that disregarded an excessive risk to inmates in protected classes, and 
that, despite being on notice of their deficient polices, the defendants failed to properly 
train and supervise deputies with respect to inmate safety.  Nguyen claimed that the 
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defendants’ conduct violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
 The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge who recommended that: (1) the 
District Court dismiss Nguyen’s claims under the Fifth Amendment because the 
defendants are not federal actors; (2) the District Court dismiss Nguyen’s claims under 
the Eighth Amendment because he had not yet been adjudicated guilty of a crime, see 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 & n.16 (1979); (3) the District Court dismiss 
without prejudice Nguyen’s claims against Deputies Stroble, Carter, and Hall because 
Nguyen did not claim that they were personally involved in the alleged misconduct, see 
Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995); and (4) Franklin County 
be substituted as a defendant in place of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department 
because the Sheriff’s Department is not a separate entity.1  The District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and ordered Nguyen to proceed solely 
on his Fourteenth Amendment claims against Franklin County and Sheriff Anthony.   
The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that their motion be granted on the grounds that: (1) Nguyen failed to 
establish liability against Franklin County and Sheriff Anthony in his official capacity 
because he did not demonstrate that they maintained an unconstitutional custom or policy 
that caused the alleged injury, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); 
                                              
1
 The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the District Court dismiss without 
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(2) Nguyen failed to establish liability under a “failure to train” theory because he did not 
submit any evidence concerning inadequate training, see Carter v. City of Phila., 181 
F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999); and (3) Nguyen failed to establish liability under the “state-
created danger” doctrine because he did not show that his injury was foreseeable or that 
the defendants acted with sufficient culpability, see Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 
F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court agreed, and, by order entered April 20, 
2012, entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  This appeal followed.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(b).  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).  We likewise 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See 
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 On appeal, Nguyen argues that he produced sufficient evidence to withstand 
dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims against Franklin County and Sheriff Anthony.  
As noted above, however, the District Court dismissed Nguyen’s Eighth Amendment 
claims on the ground that pre-trial detainees like Nguyen are protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.  We see no 
error in the District Court’s conclusion.  As the District Court correctly noted, the Eighth 
                                                                                                                                                  
prejudice several John Doe defendants that Nguyen named in the complaint. 
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Amendment applies only after the state “has secured a formal adjudication of guilt” 
because, prior to that time, it has not acquired “the power to punish with which the Eighth 
Amendment is concerned.”  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977).  To the 
extent that Nguyen’s arguments can be construed as challenging the District Court’s 
conclusion that he did not establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation because he did 
not demonstrate the existence of a state-created danger, we agree with the District Court 
that Nguyen failed to show that the defendants acted with sufficient culpability.  See 
Bright, 443 F.3d at 281. 
We have reviewed the record and discern no error in the reasoning of either the 
Magistrate Judge or the District Court regarding Nguyen’s other claims. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
